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In anticipation of the 2012 World
Health Report, this paper was commis-
sioned to help contextualize and critically
reflect on the theme of ‘‘no health without
research.’’
Introduction
Over the last two decades, recognition has
grown that the current system for the
research and development (R&D) of new
medicines does not adequately meet the
needs of the majority of the world’s popula-
tion [1–4], over 80% of which lives in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs) [5].
(We use the general term ‘‘medicines’’ to
refer broadly to drugs, vaccines, diagnostics,
and other medical products.)
The clearest illustration of these short-
comings is the lack of new medicines for
the ‘‘neglected diseases’’—those that pri-
marily affect populations with little pur-
chasing power, and therefore offer an
insufficient incentive for industry to invest
in R&D. However, the problems with
the existing system extend far beyond the
narrow notion of neglected diseases. The
challenge is better understood as one of
‘‘neglected populations’’—that is, of en-
suring that the global R&D system meets
the needs of all, especially of the poorest
and most vulnerable populations. Such
needs include not only new treatments for
neglected diseases, but also access to
antimicrobials, affordable medicines for
diseases with global incidence such as
diabetes and cancer, and products well-
adapted for use in resource-limited set-
tings. Thus far, the existing system
has largely failed to deliver on these
objectives.
These problems have prompted exten-
sive international debate and proposals for
reform. After a 2-year intergovernmental
negotiation, in 2008 governments agreed
upon the World Health Organization
(WHO) Global Strategy and Plan of Action
on Public Health, Innovation and Intellec-
tual Property, which recognized that the
current system fell short in meeting the
needs of developing countries with respect
to both communicable and non-communi-
cable diseases [4]. In April 2012, the WHO
Consultative Expert Working Group on
R&D: Financing and Coordination
(CEWG) recommended that governments
begin negotiations over a global medical
R&D convention to address some of these
problems in a systematic way [6] (see Box
1). Why might a binding international
convention be needed?
Shortcomings of the Current
R&D System
Today, patents are the main policy tool
to drive investments into medicines R&D
(Box 2) Prior to the 1990s, there was great
variation among countries in the types and
length of patents available—on average,
industrialized countries granted longer
patent terms (15–17 years), developing
countries granted shorter terms (5–10
years), and many countries—including
Western European nations—made special
exceptions for food, medicines, and agri-
cultural technologies in their national
patent laws [7,8]. However, since the
1995 entry into force of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), countries
were required to harmonize their patent
laws to the level of those developed
in Western countries with large pharma-
ceutical industries. As a result, medicines
are now subject to minimum 20-year
patent terms in most WTO Members
(except in least-developed country mem-
bers, which have an extension until at least
2016 [9]).
American economic historian Paul A.
David has likened the patent system to
a ‘‘panda’s thumb’’—a product of centu-
ries of evolution but poorly suited as a
policy tool for modern innovation [10].
Why was this system globalized?
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be a global public good—that is, knowl-
edge produced in one country can benefit
the entire global community (it is ‘‘non-
excludable’’), and disclosing that knowl-
edge does not reduce the amount of
knowledge left for others to enjoy (it is
‘‘non-rival’’) [11]. While there are poten-
tially great social benefits from the public
goods nature of medical knowledge, it
also raises the question of how the burden
of paying for such knowledge should be
distributed globally. If one country can
benefit from the investment of another,
there is a powerful temptation to ‘‘free-
ride’’ on the other’s efforts; the end result
may be aggregate global underinvestment
in R&D. One rationale for the global
harmonization of patent policies was to
distribute the burden of financing R&D
more uniformly across more countries,
and to prevent free-riding [12,13].
A key problem, however, was the
application of uniform patent rules in a
world with great wealth disparities: the
average per capita income across all high-
income countries (US$37,719) was 30
times that across all low- and lower-middle
income countries (US$1,270) [14]. Yet, a
patent allows a company to price a
medicine at the same level in the United
States as in India, as some firms have
chosen to do [15,16]. While a globalized
patent system may be effective in dealing
with the free rider problem, it does not
equitably distribute the costs of R&D and
can block access to medicines for a large
proportion of the population.
Growing dissatisfaction with the existing
system has raised the following question:
could there be a more politically sustain-
able way to distribute R&D costs across
countries so that equitable access to med-
icines is not sacrificed?
New Approaches to Access and
Innovation
Various policy experiments have been
implemented or proposed to address both
the access and innovation problems out-
lined above. HIV/AIDS provides the most
significant example of improved access to
widely patented medicines. Access to
antiretroviral (ARV) medicines for HIV
has increased over 14-fold since 2003, to
reach 6.6 million people in 2010 [17]; such
progress was enabled, in part, by low-cost
generic ARVs made widely available
through the use of TRIPS flexibilities by
governments, the policies of patent hold-
ers, and the availability of international
funding to support treatment programs
[18].
In the area of innovation, there has
been increased funding for specific ne-
glected diseases [19], technology transfer
to build research and production capacity
in developing countries [20,21], market
creation to induce the development of
pediatric formulations of ARVs [22], an
advanced market commitment to generate
adapted pneumococcal vaccines [23], a
priority regulatory review voucher granted
in exchange for bringing a neglected
disease drug to market [24], the imple-
mentation of smaller milestone prizes and
proposals for larger end-product prizes
[25–32], upstream and downstream patent
pools [33–35], and open-source approach-
es [36–38].
Of particular note are the product
development partnerships (PDPs) dedicat-
ed to neglected disease R&D, largely
financed through public and philanthropic
funds [19,39,40]. Two examples of PDPs’
potential to develop drugs at relatively
low-cost are the Drugs for Neglected
Diseases initiative (DNDi) and Medicines
for Malaria Venture (MMV). From 2003
to 2011, with an investment of EUR100
million, DNDi built a pipeline of potential
new drugs and developed six new prod-
ucts, including five combination treat-
ments for malaria, sleeping sickness, and
visceral leishmaniasis and a pediatric
formulation for Chagas disease [41]. Over
a 10-year period with a budget of US$310
million, MMV developed three new prod-
ucts, including a pediatric formulation,
injectable artesunate, and a new fixed-
dose combination, and built a pipeline
of nearly 60 projects [42]. The costs of
a non-profit PDP model that relies on
contributions from and cooperation with
both public and private partners cannot
be compared directly to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. Yet, the difference in scale
between PDP and industry costs is striking,
and underscores the need to give alternate
models serious consideration. One esti-
mate pegged the average private-sector
cost to develop a new drug at US$1.3
billion [43], though this figure has been
contested and remains controversial
[44,45]. Indeed, the pharmaceutical in-
dustry itself is testing new models for
stimulating innovation, having recently hit
a 25-year low in the number of new drugs
coming to market [37,46].
Rules of the System: Why We
Need an R&D Treaty
The CEWG systematically assessed
these various new approaches to improv-
ing the R&D system and found particu-
larly promising open-access approaches
that ‘‘de-link’’ the financing of R&D
from the pricing of end products so that
medicines can be sold near the cost of
production. However, it also concluded
that current efforts remain ad hoc, frag-
mented, and constrained by the tensions
inherent in existing rules. Current initia-
tives lack a reliable, sustainable mecha-
nism to generate sufficient funding for
research, rely heavily on donor financing
and priorities, and cover a limited set of
diseases. Commenting on access to inno-
Summary Points
N The current system for the research and development (R&D) of new medicines
does not adequately meet the needs of the majority of the world’s population.
N There is a lack of new medicines for the ‘‘neglected diseases’’—those that
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new approaches to generating R&D that meets the needs of poorer
populations, efforts remain ad hoc, fragmented, and insufficient.
N We discuss how an R&D treaty could complement and build on existing
initiatives by addressing four areas where the system remains particularly weak:
affordability, sustainable financing, efficiency in innovation, and equitable
health-centered governance.
N We argue that effective tools for global governance are required to generate
medical R&D as a global public good, based on the understanding that a
politically and financially sustainable system will require both fair contributions
from all, and fair benefit-sharing for all.
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the head of Novartis succinctly said: ‘‘We
have no model which would meet the need
for new drugs in a sustainable way…. You
can’t expect for-profit organisations to
do this in a large scale. If you want to
establish a system where companies sys-
tematically invest in this kind of area you
need a different system’’ [47].
An R&D treaty could complement and
build on existing initiatives by addressing
four areas that remain particularly weak:
affordability, sustainable financing, effi-
ciency, and equitable governance.
1. Affordability: Currently there is no
system to ensure that new medicines will
be affordable to the majority of people
who need them. Despite major progress
for HIV, no similar institutional arrange-
ments exist for widely patented drugs in
other therapeutic areas, such as the non-
communicable diseases that account for
nearly one-half of the burden of illness in
LMICs [48,49]. Affordability is likely to be
an even bigger problem for biologics, for
which generic competition is more limited
than for traditional small-molecule drugs.
A treaty could include measures to ensure
affordability, including new incentive
mechanisms that incorporate the principle
of de-linkage. Examples include licensing
through the Medicines Patent Pool or
using treaty-generated funds to reward a
prize to a successful drug developer, both
of which allow for competitive generic
production of the drug [27]. Such ap-
proaches could engender more equitable
access to the benefits of scientific progress,
but would also require reliable financial
contributions across countries. Establish-
ing the ground rules for such a system is
likely to require a binding legal instru-
ment.
2. Sustainable Financing: Currently
there are no mechanisms to ensure suf-
ficient, predictable financing of R&D to
meet health needs in LMICs. Donor
governments and non-profit entities, such
as the Gates Foundation, have invested
significantly in neglected disease R&D,
with total global funding estimated at
US$3 billion in 2010, and resulting in
140 products in development from a
baseline of almost zero a decade ago
[19]. While such progress is laudable,
neglected disease R&D funding remains
a small proportion of global spending
(about 2%). And these figures cover only
neglected diseases, not the broader range
of R&D needs of neglected populations.
However, at the same time that needs are
increasing, for example as PDPs move
promising compounds into clinical trials,
neglected disease R&D funding has de-
clined in the past year due to decreased
donor contributions amidst the economic
crisis [19]. This decline highlights the need
for more sustainable financing arrange-
ments, including the potential use of
innovative financing mechanisms that tap
into the growing capacity of middle-
income countries to contribute to R&D.
LMICs contributed an estimated US$5
billion to health R&D in 2005 [50].
A treaty could include binding obliga-
tions on governments to contribute to
R&D, with due regard for varying ability
to pay, thereby addressing the free-rider
problem while establishing equitable bur-
den-sharing arrangements. An interna-
tional agreement is likely to be required
to establish robust, sustainable, predict-
able, and sufficient financial flows for
R&D.
3. Efficiency in Innovation: There
is considerable room for improving the
efficiency of the innovation process. For
example, by impeding the free flow of
information, intellectual property rights
can retard the accumulation of common
knowledge that drives forward scientific
progress [51,52]. Recognizing this prob-
lem, open-source R&D initiatives by
publicly funded research labs or pre-
competitive platforms among pharmaceu-
tical firms have been established to
facilitate knowledge-sharing; these initia-
tives hold promise, but remain few and
nascent [53]. Another inefficiency arises
from market incentives that reward the
development of ‘‘me-too’’ drugs that are
lucrative, but similar to pre-existing med-
icines and/or offer little or no therapeutic
advance [54]. However, we have no global
ground rules to facilitate open-source
approaches, nor to counteract duplicative
R&D investments in some areas or the
relative neglect of others. A treaty could
establish rules to improve efficiency in
innovation. For example, global norms
regarding research priorities and transpar-
ency in investment decisions could facili-
tate more efficient self-organization of
the global scientific community. A treaty
would not necessarily imply a centralized
body directing all research activities, but
rather, could establish rules that foster
creativity such as incentives for faster
global knowledge-sharing.
4. Equitable Health-Focused Gov-
ernance: Market incentives, not health
needs or public priorities, largely drive
private R&D investments. A treaty could
craft governance arrangements to ensure
that the public interest drives innovation,
rather than market-generated profits
alone. For example, treaty rules could
structure financial rewards for innovation
so that they are commensurate with a
medicine’s health benefit [31]. In addition,
as noted above, donors play a central role
in financing the R&D now dedicated to
the specific needs of developing coun-
tries—a welcome contribution, but one
that also leaves priority-setting decisions
largely in their hands. A system in which
all countries contributed finances and
knowledge could form the basis of more
equitable governance arrangements in
which affected populations have a stronger
voice in decision-making.
Treaty proposals have included other
measures, such as those to encourage
regional cooperation among regulatory
authorities, or enhance transparency in
clinical trial results [55–58]. But since a
comparative review of the proposals lies
beyond the scope of this article, we have
highlighted the four main systemic weak-
nesses above as forming the core rationale
for a binding international instrument.
Some of these weaknesses can be
addressed, at least in part, through
national action. For example, patents
can be licensed to improve affordability,
and pharmacoeconomic assessments for
medicines can link reimbursements to
therapeutic efficacy. However, in a world
in which information flows instantly
across borders, research is carried out in
dispersed networks, trade in medicines
spans the globe, and intellectual property
rules have already been globalized, co-
herent systemic change requires the
negotiation of global rules. This, in turn,
requires the collective engagement of
governments.
The mere negotiation of a treaty will
not be a panacea, and several areas
require particular vigilance. First, as with
most areas of international law, enforce-
ment remains a thorny issue. Treaty
negotiators will need to pay special
attention to mechanisms that encourage
compliance and manage free-riding. Such
mechanisms could include traditional
methods such as reporting and transpar-
ency requirements, as well as tools that
have more teeth, such as provisions
allowing countries that contribute ex ante
to R&D through the treaty to pay lower
prices for the medicines that are devel-
oped, while non-participating countries
pay more. Second, treaty negotiations
should not be seen as a replacement for
ongoing policy experiments in new ways to
generate innovation; such efforts should
continue both for the immediate health
benefits they can deliver through new
products, and for the evidence they can
provide to inform longer-term treaty
design. Finally, treaty negotiations promise
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 3 May 2012 | Volume 9 | Issue 5 | e1001218to be complex, lengthy, and resource-
intensive. In order to merit such costly
efforts, the final treaty must meet at least
four key objectives: affordability of medi-
cines, sustainable R&D finance, freer
sharing of knowledge, and equitable gov-
ernance that puts health at the system’s
core.
Conclusions
Medical innovation and access to the
fruits of scientific progress are no longer
policy concerns restricted to the national
level or to wealthy countries alone. In an
era of health interdependence, effective
tools for global governance are required
to generate medical R&D as a global
public good that can deliver benefits for all
[11,59]. A treaty is a promising tool for
improving the coherence, fairness, effi-
ciency, and sustainability of the global
R&D system. It should be based on the
understanding that a politically and finan-
cially sustainable system for generating
health research will require both fair
contributions from all, and fair benefit-
sharing for all.
The recommendations of the CEWG
can be seen as the product of nearly two
decades of growing dissatisfaction with the
shortcomings of the current R&D system.
Leaders of governments, civil society,
industry, and academia should seize this
unprecedented opportunity to move for-
ward.
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